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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Commission spends much of its brief making a full-throated 
endorsement of disclosure requirements even though no disclosure requirements 
are challenged here.  Between the Commission’s focus on unchallenged disclosure 
requirements and its attempt to refocus the case on the Leadership Fund’s 
sponsoring organization, rather than the Leadership Fund itself, in its 
“Counterstatement of the Issue Presented,” the Commission establishes that it has 
missed what this case is about. 
This case is primarily about the Leadership Fund—an independent legal 
entity—and its right to speak.  The Commission does not dispute that the 
Leadership Fund is a separate entity with its own speech rights, yet it ignores the 
myriad arguments and substantive discussion the Leadership Fund provided in the 
opening brief on the real issue presented here:  whether the Leadership Fund has a 
constitutional right to solicit and accept contributions from members of the general 
public so long as they are kept in a non-contribution account.  As secondary 
matters, the case also implicitly addresses the rights of potential contributors and 
sponsoring organizations to associate and speak by providing funds to the 
Leadership Fund. 
With respect to the Leadership Fund’s right to speak, the appellants 
established in the opening brief that the Supreme Court has recognized only one 
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governmental interest in restricting political speech—the anti-corruption interest.  
The appellants further established that the anti-corruption interest does not apply 
here.  The Commission apparently agrees, as it does not claim that the anti-
corruption interest supports the government’s speech restrictions as applied to the 
Leadership Fund.  Additionally, the Commission has abandoned the other flawed 
interests asserted by the district court.
Rather than defend the district court’s ruling, the Commission asks this 
Court to adopt a new interest for restricting political speech—the disclosure 
interest.  But it offers no reason why this Court should vastly expand this 
government interest in compelling speech (by requiring disclosure) so that it can 
give the government the power to muzzle speakers simply by failing to require 
disclosure.  There is none.  If Congress wishes separate segregated funds (“SSFs”) 
to disclose contributors, sponsorship funds, or any other aspect of an SSF’s 
existence, the Commission’s arguments here can be appropriately raised.  But in 
this case, arguments over the value of disclosure requirements amount to nothing 
more than a straw man. 
The Court should not be distracted by the vigor of the Commission’s defense 
of disclosure requirements.  No disclosure requirements are at issue here.  And in 
light of the fact that the Commission has no response to the arguments raised in the 
opening brief, the district court’s decision should be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE LEADERSHIP FUND HAS INDEPENDENT FIRST 
AMENDMENT SPEECH RIGHTS.
The Leadership Fund is organized as a separate segregated fund and 
therefore has independent First Amendment rights.  Yet the Commission’s entire 
argument is dependent upon re-directing the Court’s focus to the rights of Stop 
This Insanity, Inc. (“STI”) and ignoring that this case is primarily brought by the 
Leadership Fund.  It is the  Leadership Fund whose rights are most trampled by the 
Federal Election Campaign Act (the “Act”)  prohibiting the Leadership Fund from 
opening a non-contribution account and soliciting and receiving contributions from 
the general public.
STI and the Leadership Fund are separate legal entities, and the Commission 
admits as much.  AB 28.  Thus, each possesses an independent right to speak 
regardless of the Leadership Fund’s role as a connected political action committee 
(“PAC”), for which it receives both specific benefits and specific burdens.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010).  That the Leadership Fund is 
organized as an SSF does not justify depriving it of the same robust First 
Amendment speech and associational rights that protect the full-throated political 
speech of other PACs, individuals, labor unions, corporations, and non-profits.  
The Supreme Court has long recognized that its “foundational First Amendment 
cases” are grounded in the recognition that “citizens must be able to discuss issues, 
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great or small, through the means of expression they deem best suited to their 
purpose.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 781 (2000).  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has expressly rejected the notion that a PAC’s “form of organization or method of 
solicitation diminishes [its] entitlement to First Amendment protection.”   FEC v. 
Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm. (“NCPAC”), 470 U.S. 480, 494 (1985).
The Leadership Fund fully addressed this point over 10 pages of the AOB.  AOB 
18-27.  The Commission did not argue that SSFs do not have free speech rights 
simply by virtue of the fact that they are connected organizations, nor could it. 
Rather, the Commission strives to misdirect the analysis toward STI and 
away from the independent rights of the Leadership Fund.  But in Citizens United,
the Supreme Court expressly recognized that an SSF is a separate association, 
distinct from its connected corporation.  558 U.S. at 337.  Accordingly, the fact 
that an SSF could engage in some speech did not cure the constitutional maladies 
in banning its connected corporation’s speech.  Id.  Nor is the inverse true—that
because a corporation’s speech is not banned, a connected SSF’s may be silenced.   
Moreover, it is irrelevant that the sponsoring organization establishes the 
SSF.  AB 27.  Once established, the SSF is its own entity.  An SSF cannot choose 
to organize itself, AB 26, but neither can any other organization.  The key point is 
that, once organized, an SSF exists separate and apart from its sponsoring 
organization, and it exists as a collection of people who wish to speak.  Thus, it 
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does not follow that “no SSF can ever exist apart from the [sponsoring 
organization’s] desire to engage in [political] spending.”  AB 27. 
The Commission’s theory could have dangerous, wide-ranging implications.  
Under its reasoning, the government can restrict the speech of wholly-owned 
subsidiaries of corporations because they do not exist separately from the control 
of the company that owns them.  No PAC exists separately from the desire of its 
contributors to speak.  Allowing restrictions on speech based on the ability of those 
forming the organization to speak cannot be a proper application of the First 
Amendment.
Therefore, it is irrelevant whether STI chooses to speak, how much it 
chooses to speak, or why it chooses to speak or not speak.1  STI is a separate 
organization, and its ability to speak is no more justification for restricting the 
                                           
1 The Commission asserts that if the only issue here is the Leadership Fund’s 
independent activity, then STI would “seem to lack” a redressable injury-in-fact 
and would have no Article III standing.  AB 28.  That is beside the point of 
whether the Leadership Fund is an independent entity with its own speech rights.
See Americans for Safe Access v. DEA, 706 F.3d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(holding that “to proceed to the merits of [Appellants’] claims, we need only find 
one party with standing”).  In any event, the Commission has not moved to dismiss 
STI, nor would such a motion have merit.  Just as Glengary LLC and the individual 
appellants have constitutional interests in contributing to the Leadership Fund so 
that their voices may be heard, so does STI. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349 
(“Political speech does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its 
source is a corporation.’”) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784).
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Leadership Fund’s speech as does the right to speak of any other company, person, 
or organization. 
II. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTEREST IN RESTRICTING THE 
LEADERSHIP FUND’S SPEECH. 
A. Strict Scrutiny Applies to the Contribution, Source, and 
Solicitation Restrictions.
The source and solicitation restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny.  The 
Commission argues that limitations on the amount of contributions are subject to 
intermediate scrutiny, citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) and relying most 
heavily on McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).  AB 34-36.  The Commission 
ignores that this case is about (1) whether certain people may contribute at all, and 
(2) whether the Leadership Fund may solicit contributions from the general public, 
which necessarily conveys political speech.  These restrictions are far more 
burdensome and thus command a higher level of scrutiny 
In McConnell, the Supreme Court explained that limitations on the amount
an individual may contribute are subject to intermediate scrutiny because 
“contribution limits ‘leave the contributor free to become a member of any 
political association and to assist personally in the association’s efforts on behalf of 
candidates,’ and allow associations ‘to aggregate large sums of money to promote 
effective advocacy.’”  540 U.S. at 136 (citations omitted).  The Court further stated 
that “[t]he ‘overall effect’ of dollar limits on contributions is ‘merely to require 
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candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of 
persons.’” Id.
The reason the Court ruled a lower level of scrutiny was appropriate in 
McConnell is undermined by the source restrictions here.  SSFs cannot raise funds 
from a greater number of persons because all but a narrowly defined class are 
prohibited from contributing.  And the solicitation restrictions directly prohibit 
core political speech, AOB 42, which is not the case with respect to limits on the 
amount a person can contribute to a party or candidate. 
The Commission only makes a passing argument against the appellants’ 
analysis in the opening brief, stating that none of the authorities cited specifically 
referred to SSFs.  AB 37.  That is, of course, irrelevant. The Commission makes 
no effort to explain why SSFs (and their potential contributors ) receive a lower 
level of scrutiny over restrictions on their speech.  As is explained above, infra, § 
I., there is no reason to differentiate among organizational forms to determine the 
weight of their free speech rights. 
Regardless, the Court need not resolve the level of scrutiny applicable here.  
Under any level of analysis, the source and solicitation restrictions as applied to the 
Leadership Fund are unconstitutional.   
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B. The Government Has No Interest In Restricting The Leadership 
Fund’s Non-Contribution Speech Or Contributions Thereto. 
Free speech analysis requires weighing the burden on speech against the 
asserted governmental interest.  See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 692 
(D.C. Cir. 2010).  The burden here is obvious:  the Leadership Fund’s ability to 
speak is limited by restrictions on accepting funds for non-contribution 
expenditures, 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(C) and 441a(a)(3); source prohibitions, § 
4441b(a); and solicitation restrictions, § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i). See, § II.D., post.  And 
there is no countervailing interest.  The Commission has correctly abandoned all of 
the district court’s reasoning as to the government’s interests in restricting the 
Leadership Fund’s speech.  It has correctly abandoned the invalid anti-distortion 
interest; it has correctly abandoned the invalid equalization interest, and most 
importantly, it has correctly abandoned the inapplicable anti-corruption interest. 
In the opening brief, the appellants noted that “[i]n the context of restricting 
political speech in connection with campaign financing, the Supreme Court has 
only recognized one interest that may outweigh the First Amendment interests: 
preventing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption.”  AOB 
28 (citing SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 692).  The Commission does not refute that.  
Citizens United, EMILY’s List v. FEC , 581 F.3d 1(2009), and SpeechNow are 
based on the principle that non-contribution expenditures do not give rise to actual 
or apparent quid pro quo corruption and therefore may not constitutionally be 
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limited or proscribed.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. 
at 25.  Accordingly,  this case does not implicate the anti-corruption interest. 
The Commission has no response.  The Commission’s reasoning—relying 
on EMILY’s List footnote 7—that EMILY’s List is inapplicable because the Court
“repeatedly emphasized that its ‘constitutional analysis of non-profits applies only 
to non-connected non-profits’ . . . while explicitly disclaiming to address the 
constitutionality of FECA as applied to SSFs.”  AB 47 (citing EMILY’s List, 581 
F.3d at 8 n.7), is disingenuous.  In the Commission’s notice that it was deleting 
various regulations in response to EMILY’s List, the Commission expressly 
adopted a commentator’s argument that footnote 7 “was simply a description of 
how the term ‘non-profit entities’ was to be used in the opinion because the term 
‘non-profit entities’ does not appear in the Act.”  Explanation and Justification for 
Final Rules on Funds Received in Response to Solicitations, 75 Fed. Reg. 13223, 
13224 (Mar. 19, 2010).  In the Commission’s own words: “Although the court 
defined the term non-profit entities as not including SSFs, the court explicitly 
ordered the District Court to ‘vacate the challenged regulations,’ referring to [the 
regulations] in their entirety.  The court provides no exception for SSFs.”  Id.
The Commission’s attempt to distinguish SpeechNow and EMILY’s List by 
noting that they do not address disclosure requirements, AB 49, also fails.  It is part 
of the Commission’s overall attempt to recast the issue in this case as one of a 
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“constitutional right to conceal such political spending.”  AB 39.  That claim 
suffers from two faulty premises.  The first is that this case involves a challenge to 
disclosure requirements.  There is no such challenge here.  The second is that it is 
constitutionally permissible to restrict speech because courts have found it 
constitutionally permissible to compel speech based on the disclosure interest.  
That is not so, and the Commission does not identify a single case in which the 
Supreme Court has ruled that a disclosure interest justifies restrictions on speech 
rather than an area where Congress may require disclosure. See e.g., AB 42-43 
(stating that eight Justices in Citizens United agreed that the Act’s disclosure 
requirements were “constitutionally permissible”) (emphasis added).   
In Citizens Against Rent Control, the Court noted that an ordinance limiting 
contributions to PACs formed to support or oppose ballot measures submitted to 
the public placed an “impermissible restraint” on freedom of association and “the 
freedom of expression of groups and those individuals who wish to express their 
views through committees.” Id. at 299.  The Court rejected disclosure as an 
interest justifying the restraint, holding that “[t]he integrity of the political system 
will be adequately protected if contributors are identified in a public filing 
revealing the amounts contributed; if it is thought wise, legislation can outlaw 
anonymous contributions.”  Id. at 299-300. Accordingly, because there was “no 
significant state or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot 
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measure,” the “limits on contributions which in turn limit[ed] expenditures plainly 
impair[ed] freedom of expression” and were struck down. Id.
It is a bedrock constitutional principle that the government cannot condition 
a benefit on the surrender of First Amendment rights. See Pickering v. Board of 
Educ. Twp. High School, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (rejecting that “teachers may 
constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would 
otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection 
with the operation of the public schools in which they work”); Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (holding that because a tax exemption is a “privilege” or 
“bounty” does not preclude its denial from constituting an impermissible 
infringement of speech).  But that is exactly what the Commission seeks to do.  
Congress has not yet changed disclosure requirements for SSFs in light of Citizens
United.  But such Congressional inaction cannot justify the continued 
unconstitutional suppression the Leadership Fund ’s independent speech.  In such a 
scenario, the statutory “tail” wags the First Amendment “dog.” 
Under the Commission’s theory, the government could simply undo Citizens
United and restrict the speech of corporations, labor unions, non-connected PACs 
and non-profit entities simply by granting disclosure exemptions.  The appellants 
made this point in the opening brief, AOB 50, and the Commission has not 
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articulated any limiting principle in response.  There is none under the 
Commission’s reasoning. 
In sum, the Commission cannot unconstitutionally enforce a statute because 
its constitutionally permissible application creates an “anomalous effect” Congress 
would not have contemplated before part of the statute was found unconstitutional.
If Congress wants to ensure that contributions are disclosed to the public, 
Congress’ only potentially constitutional remedy is to amend the exemption it 
created and foster more public disclosure of corporate solicitations for SSFs. 
C. The Solicitation Prohibition Does Not Further An Anti-Coercion 
Interest and the Leadership Fund’s Plan of Action Nonetheless 
Addresses Such Concerns.     
The appellants established that the anti-coercion interest is not served by 
prohibiting the Leadership Fund from making targeted solicitations to people who 
are not part of the restricted class or by making generalized solicitations, like radio 
and television ads.  AOB 46-52.  The Commission’s responses are inapposite and 
confused.  For instance, the Commission responds to the point that other 
regulations prohibit coercion by stating that the Leadership Fund has not “pledged 
to abide by these restrictions.”  AB 54.  Of course the Leadership Fund would 
abide by the restrictions.  They are law.  And if the Leadership Fund did not abide 
by the provisions, the Commission could enforce them. 
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Similarly, without support, the Commission claims that Congress has 
determined that solicitations to employees “are inherently coercive.”  AB 52.  But 
the Leadership Fund does not challenge limitations on how often it can solicit 
employees.  In any event, if Congress had determined such solicitations were 
inherently coercive, it would not have allowed them. Yet it specifically allowed 
direct solicitations to the employees.  Given the fact that some direct solicitations 
to the restricted class are not too coercive for Congress, it only stands to reason 
that direct solicitations to others that the restricted class will not be privy to and 
general solicitations on radio and television that restricted class members might 
overhear are not unduly coercive because they are not directed in any meaningful 
way at the employees as apart from the general public. 2
                                           
2 The Commission’s argument that the ability to solicit unlimited amounts for non-
contribution expenditures twice yearly will “coerce” employees, AB 53, while 
soliciting up to $5,000 from employees twice yearly is not coercive, ignores the 
historical context in which the $5,000 limit was passed.  The median household 
income in the United States is currently $46,326. See How Much Does the 
Average American Make?, available at http://www.mybudget360.com/how-much-
does-the-averageamerican-make-breaking-down-the-us-household-income-
numbers/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2012).  In the year Congress passed these 
restrictions and exemptions, the year 1976, the median household income was 
$10,962 in nominal terms.  Dave Manual, Median Household Income in the United 
States, available at http://www.davemanuel.com/median-household-income.php
(last visited Aug. 22, 2012).  And yet, in 1976, the nominal contribution limit was 
nearly half that median household income: $5,000.  That means Congress allowed 
a corporation to solicit a maximum contribution of 45.6% of an average 
employee’s median household income, twice per year.  These data demonstrate that 
Continued on following page 
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Indeed, the superficial nature of the Commission’s concern that the 
Leadership Fund’s proposed non-contribution expenditure solicitations to the 
general public could coerce the employees of its connected organization, AB50-53, 
is revealed by the Commission’s Club for Growth Advisory Opinion. See FEC
Advisory Op. 2010-09, (Club for Growth), 2010 WL 3184267, at *3 (July 22, 
2010) (“Club for Growth AO”).  In the Club for Growth AO, the Commission 
agreed that the corporation, Club for Growth, Inc. (the “Club”) could establish an 
independent expenditure-only PAC (the “Club PAC”) that could solicit and accept 
contributions from the general public even if the Club paid for the PAC’s 
establishment, administrative, and solicitation expenses.  Id.  It did not express a 
coercion concern.  Indeed, the Commission argues here that STI can engage in the 
same speech and solicitations the Leadership Fund requests through a super PAC.
AB 32, 42.  So, clearly, no anti-coercion interest is served under the Commission’s 
view.  Similarly, the Commission fails to justify its concern over coercion of 
suppliers, AB 54, in light of the fact that a corporation can solicit suppliers through 
other forms of PACs by the Commission’s own admission, AB 32. 
                                           
Continued from previous page 
it is not the quantitative contribution limits that prevent coercion—otherwise 
Congress would have chosen a lower amount. 
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Accordingly, the Commission can point to no interests sufficient to justify 
prohibiting the Leadership Fund from soliciting the general public for non-
contribution expenditures.  See U.S. v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agr. 
Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 595 (1957) (“It is startling to learn that a 
union spokesman or the spokesman for a corporate interest has fewer constitutional 
rights when he talks to the public than when he talks to members of his group.”)   
D. The Act, As Applied Here, Burdens Speech.
The Leadership Fund’s ability to speak is limited by restrictions on 
accepting funds for non-contribution expenditures, 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(C) and 
441a(a)(3); source prohibitions, § 4441b(a); and solicitation restrictions, § 
441b(b)(4)(A)(i).  And any burden on speech is unconstitutional when the 
government has no interest in restricting the speech.  AOB 27-31, 32-40, 43-45; 
see also SpeechNow, 559 F.3d at 695 (“All that matters is that the First 
Amendment cannot be encroached upon for naught” and noting that where the 
government has no interest, “something outweighs nothing every time.”) 
(quotations and marks omitted).  That the Leadership Fund can, at significant 
burden, clone itself and form another organization does not eliminate the burden on 
speech.  AOB 24-26; see also Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 708 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“That the avenue left open is 
more burdensome than the one foreclosed is ‘sufficient to characterize [a 
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regulatory interpretation] as an infringement on First Amendment activities.’”) 
(quoting FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 255 (1986) 
(“MCFL”)).  And the Commission does not argue otherwise. 
In a footnote, the Commission takes issue with the Leadership Fund’s 
argument that being limited to a small restricted class severely limits the amount of 
money it can raise.  AB30 n.9.  Oddly, it relies on cases stating that there is no 
equalization interest for supporting government restrictions on speech. E.g. Davis 
v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738 (2008).  The Leadership Fund is not asking the 
government to restrict anyone’s speech to equalize speaking ability, and so the 
Commission’s argument fails.  
The Commission primarily claims that STI is not burdened here because it 
could form another PAC.  AB 29-33.  As an initial matter, the fact that STI can 
form another PAC is irrelevant to whether the Leadership Fund is burdened by 
speech restrictions.  See § I., infra.  Second, assuming STI is “able to operate a 
super PAC,” that does not mean it would not be burdensome for STI to form and 
operate one.  The additional requirements in creating a second PAC “may create a 
disincentive for [plaintiffs] to engage in political speech.  Detailed record-keeping 
and disclosure obligations, along with the duty to appoint a treasurer and custodian 
of the records, impose administrative costs that many small entities may be unable 
to bear.” MCFL, 479 U.S. at 254-55. 
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III. THE LEADERSHIP FUND DID NOT WAIVE ITS SECTION 441b(a) 
CHALLENGE.
The Commission does not refute any of the Leadership Fund’s argument 
establishing that it did not waive its challenge to Section 441b(a).  In a footnote, 
the Commission only states that “the complaint in this case does not clearly 
articulate the nature of any challenge” regarding section 441b(a), which prohibits 
SSFs from accepting, inter alia, contributions from corporations.  AB 56 n.22.  
The Commission does not cite any law for its proffered “clear articulation” 
standard, and does not even suggest that the Commission failed to meet Rule 8’s 
notice pleading requirement.  The Complaint provides proper notice of the 
challenge to Section 441b(a) as applied, and the issue was fully litigated below.
AOB 52-54.  Thus, it is not waived.  Additionally, the parties agree that no 
separate argument is necessary to address the challenge to Section 441b(a) because 
the standards by which all of the other challenged sections are judged apply 
equally to Section 441b(a) here.  AOB 54; AB 56 n.22. 
IV. APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
The factors weighed in determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate 
all favor the appellants here.3  AOB 55-58.  In response to the significant burdens 
                                           
3 The appellants agree that if the request for injunctive relief would be moot if the 
district court’s dismissal of the action were affirmed. 
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on the Leadership Fund’s speech created by the statutes and regulations at issue 
here, the Commission once again claims that there is no burden on STI.  For the 
reasons stated above, the burden on STI exists but is not the primary burden here.  
The Leadership Fund’s ability to speak is restricted.  Moreover, appellants 
Glengary, LLC, Todd Cefretti, and Ladd Ehlinger—whom the Commission 
ignores—continue to be harmed by being prevented from making contributions to 
the Leadership Fund.  And as stated in the opening brief and not refuted by the 
Commission, “‘[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods 
of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’”  AOB 56 (quoting Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). 
Additionally, the balance of hardships and public interest weigh in favor of 
injunctive relief.  The Supreme Court has made clear that in any conflict between 
First Amendment rights and regulation, courts “must give the benefit of any doubt 
to protecting rather stifling speech,” and that “the tie goes to the speaker, not the 
censor.” FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469, 474 (2007).
There is no tie here, though.  The Commission only asserts a hardship insofar as it 
must require disclosure and prevent coercion.  But even if the injunction is entered, 
the Leadership Fund must and will comply with all disclosure requirements 
applicable to SSFs and all restrictions on directly soliciting the restricted class.  If 
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the Leadership Fund did not do so, the Commission would be within its rights to 
enforce those provisions just as it always has been permitted to do. 
Moreover, an injunction is in the public interest.   The Supreme Court “has 
long viewed the First Amendment as protecting a marketplace for the clash of 
differing views and conflicting ideas. That concept has been stated and restated 
almost since the Constitution was drafted.”  Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 
U.S. at 295.  “Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means 
to hold officials accountable to the people.  The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, 
to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to 
enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”  Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 339.
Indeed, the First Amendment reflects our “profound national commitment to 
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open.” N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  In sum, appellants ’ 
activities are at the core of the First Amendment.  The Leadership Fund, as an SSF, 
must be permitted to make non-contribution expenditures out of unlimited 
corporate, union, or individual funds, even though it maintains a separate bank 
account that contributes to candidates from amount- and source-restricted funds. 
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Leadership Fund and other appellants 
respectably request that this Court reverse the district court’s order dismissing this 
case and denying a preliminary injunction, and direct that the district court enter a 
preliminary injunction enjoining the contribution limits contained in 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441a(a)(1)(C) and 441a(a)(3), the source prohibitions at § 441b(a), the 
solicitation restrictions at § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i) and all related regulations as applied 
to the appellants. 
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